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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of lawsuits in America today has caused nothing to
remain sacred or out of reach of a party who believes they have been
wronged. A defeated party may try to attack any and all actors, the
adjudicators and even the entire judicial process. Before 1980, a dearth of
case law existed on claims against individual arbitrators, arbitration panels
or sponsoring organizations for breach of contract, gross negligence, mental
anguish or numerous other torts. Since 1980, the arbitration process' has
been deluged by defeated parties claiming foul and looking for restitution.
As individual arbitrators and the organizations that sponsor arbitration came
under attack, courts and some state legislatures alike responded and
wrapped the arbitration process in a cloak of immunity.
The cloak turned into armor as not only arbitrators and sponsoring
organizations received immunity, but also architects, appraisers, engineers
and labor grievance committees were given refuge when acting in a "quasi-
judicial" nature. The extension of arbitral immunity to this group of
nonarbitrators acting in a "quasi-judicial" role, however, has resulted in
chinks in the armor as some jurisdictions refused to bestow immunity.
While some exceptions exist, today a mantle of absolute immunity protects
arbitrators and sponsoring organizations from civil liability for their actions
and decisions throughout the arbitration process. The expansion of arbitral
immunity may have reached its limit with a recent Ninth Circuit decision,
United States v. City of Hayward.2
* 36 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 65 (1995).
1 Arbitration is defined as:
A process of dispute resolution on which a mutual third party (arbitrator) renders a
decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard. Where
arbitration is voluntary, the disputing parties select the arbitrator who has the power to
render a binding decision.
An arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons on
some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is
intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary
litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
236 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1994), cen. denied, 116 S. Ct. 65 (1995). The court's decision
in City of Hayward did not limit a new quasi-judicial actor from seeking arbitral immunity as
much as clarify what constitutes an arbitrator or independent adjudicatory officer. However,
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This Note examines the history of arbitral immunity, its development
and its future in the wake of United States v. City of Hayward. While it is
not the scope of this Note to argue for or against absolute immunity,
throughout this Note the arguments supplied by advocates of a qualified
immunity standard as well as the arguments for an absolute immunity
standard will be presented. Part II begins with a synopsis of the doctrine of
arbitral immunity, its origin and theoretical basis. Part III explores the
expansion of arbitral immunity and the practical and policy justifications for
its evolution. The attacks on the scope of arbitral immunity and efficacy of
such attacks are examined in Part IV. Lastly, Part V focuses on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. City of Hayward and its possible
impact on other cities and the courts.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
In order to better understand the evolution of arbitral immunity, one
needs to examine the beginnings of arbitral immunity as the seeds for its
theoretical justifications were planted at that time. The doctrine of arbitral
immunity has its roots in the doctrine of judicial immunity. 3 Arbitral
immunity actually depends on the degree that an individual's responsibilities
and judgments exude "functional comparability" with those of judges.4 An
overview of judicial immunity, its purpose and its limitations is therefore
useful to establish the foundation on which arbitral immunity stands.
A. History of Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity, like most American jurisprudence, has its origins in
early seventeenth century England. Lord Coke first stated the general rule
ofjudicial immunity in Floyd v. Barker5 and The Marshalsea.6 The rule was
based primarily on policy concerns and designed to allow judges to exercise
their independent judgments, assure decisional finality and preserve
confidence in the judicial process. 7 The rule granted almost absolute
the court's classification of an arbitrator or sponsoring organizations may have repercussions
for other sponsoring organizations of compulsory arbitration.
3 See Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitral immtunity Under American Law, in ARBITRATION
& THE LAW, 1990-1991, at 162 (1991).
4 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). The Court stated that immunity
does not attach to a person based on their position, rather immunity is granted because of the
nature of the responsibilities. See id. at 511.
5 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
6 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).
7 See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immuniry, II INDUS. REL. L.J.
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immunity to judges and protected them from personal liability for damages
resulting from their judicial decisions. 8
Lord Coke established the two main limits to judicial immunity as well:
the "judicial acts" and "jurisdictional" requirements.9 First, a judge will
not be immune if acting in an administrative, legislative or personal
capacity, rather than his judicial capacity. 10 Likewise, a judge will not be
immune for those acts exercised in the clear absence of jurisdiction. 11 A
Massachusetts court first applied the doctrine of judicial immunity in
America and held that a judge is immune if the court over which he presides
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the litigation. 12
Twent-four years later, the United States Supreme Court adopted the
doctrine of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher.13
The United States Supreme Court over the next 100 years broadly
interpreted the doctrine of judicial immunity and expanded its scope. 14 In
228, 230 (1989); Mark A. Sponseller, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified
Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421, 424-425 (1993). The underlying
rationale for the Supreme Court's endorsement of judicial immunity was explained in Pierson
v. Ray:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within hisjurisdiction that are brought before him,
including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a
burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to
intimidation.
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See Pratt v. Gardner, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 63, 71 (Mass. 1848).
13 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1872). The Supreme Court had tacitly endorsed the principle of
judicial immunity three years earlier. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 536 (1869). The
Court, however, expressed itself more strenuously in Bradley and stated: "[A] general
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice [is] that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley, 80 U.S. at 349.
14 See generally J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial
Immunity, 1980 DuKE LJ. 879; Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History
and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REv. 201 (1980). See also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir.
1926), aflg 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam) (immunity given to federal prosecutors);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity extended to state judges); Imbler v.
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Stump v. Sparkman, the Court pushed the limits of judicial immunity and
held a judge will not be subject to liability even if the decision made or
action taken was clearly in error or ultra vires. 15 Although Judge Stump
violated basic tenants of due process, 16 the Court found neither the
"jurisdictional" nor "judicial acts" limitations applicable. 17 Judge Stump
did not act in the "clear absence of jurisdiction" as state court judges have
general jurisdiction over matters relating to minor children within their
state. The Court also announced that for the purposes of judicial immunity,
an act is "judicial" if the act is a function "normally performed by a judge"
and if the parties "dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 18 Judge
Stump, similar to other state judges, normally granted petitions relating to
the affairs of minor children, and the girl's mother dealt with Judge Stump
in his judicial capacity. 19
Despite the harshness and criticism of the Stump decision, the courts
have repeatedly followed the Stump ruling and pierced the veil of judicial
immunity in the narrowest of circumstances. 20 As a general rule, judges are
not immune from criminal prosecutions2 1 nor from impeachment from
federal or state legislatures. 22 Judges are also not immune, in many states
that elect their judiciary, from the political repercussions of their conduct. 23
Except when a judge acts in "the clear abuse of all jurisdiction over the
subject matter,"24 judges will only be personally liable when acting in a
administrative or ministerial manner. 25 In situations where individuals seek
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (immunity granted to state prosecutors).
15 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Judge Stump, an Indiana circuit court judge, approved a
mother's petition to allow a doctor to perform a tubal ligation on her minor daughter.
16 See id. at 360-362. Judge Stump authorized the sterilization without a hearing, a
guardian ad litem was never appointed to protect the minor fifteen year-old girl, and the girl
did not even receive notice of the procedure.
17 See id. at 362.
18 id.
19 See id.
20 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 232.
21 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974).
22 See Michael R. King, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for
Limited Liability, 20 ARiZ. L. REV. 549, 563 (1978).
23 The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct declares that judges are to "act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and the impartiality of the
judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990). While it is not within the
scope of this Note, many commentators have argued that the process of electing judges greatly
tests and endangers the integrity of the judiciary.
24 Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351.
25 See King, supra note 22, at 576-577. The Supreme Court in Forrester v. Allen, 484
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equitable relief, however, judges do not have absolute immunity even while
acting in their judicial capacity. 2 6 Moreover, judicial immunity will not bar
claims for attorneys' fees resulting from a successful suit against judges for
injunctive relief.27
Over time, the principles behind judicial immunity were expanded to
protect the entire judicial process, not merely judges. 28 Courts realized that
jurors and prosecutors perform functions analogous to judges and need to be
absolutely immune from personal liability. 29 Jurors and prosecutors, like
judges, must be free from the intimidation and fear of collateral attacks
from disgruntled litigants in order to act impartially.3 0 Professor Nolan
argues that judicial immunity "is a means to an end, not an end in itself,"
and that it satisfies the universal concerns common to all decisionmakers
who perform any quasi-judicial function, especially arbitrators. 31
U.S. 219, 229-230 (1988), held that a judge does not have absolute immunity in performing
administrative functions such as employment decisions. The Court further stated that absolute
immunity is "justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to
whom it attached." Id. at 227.
26 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 537 (1984). See also Heimbach v. Village of
Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1977) judicial immunity does not extend to actions for
injunctive relict).
27 See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 544. Injunctive relief and attorney fees may also be given
for violations of The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
28 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 232.
29 See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1926), afflg 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per
curiam) (quasi-judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976)
(quasi-judicial immunity).
30 See id.
31 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 232. Nolan and Abrams comment:
If judicial immunity existed simply to protect those individuals holding judicial office,
there would be no reason to extend it to others. Judicial immunity exists for a broader
purpose, however, to protect litigants and the litigation process by ensuring judicial
independence and decisional finality. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. That
purpose requires that all who perform judge-like functions be protected from liability even if
they are not true judges. A variety of decisionmakers, in both the public and private spheres,
"adjudieate" disputes. They, like judges, must be free from fear of liability or harassment in
order to exercise their responsibilities with complete impartiality.
Id.
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B. Arbitral Immunity
Common-law arbitral immunity resembles judicial immunity. Both are
limited by "jurisdictional" requirements, and like judges, only the
arbitrators' "arbitral acts" will be afforded absolute immunity. 32 Arbitral
immunity in America was embraced by an Iowa court in Jones v. Brown.33
In Jones, an arbitrator brought suit to collect outstanding fees. 34 The losing
party counterclaimed and charged the arbitrator with fraud and conspiracy
to defraud. 35 The court dismissed the action and held the arbitrator was
immune for his quasi-judicial acts.36
Similar to judicial immunity, arbitral immunity "exists for the parties
and the public, not for the arbitrators themselves." 37 A neutral arbitrator is
paramount to preserve the integrity of the arbitration process and by
necessity must act independently without undue influence. 38 The role of an
arbitrator has traditionally been deemed to be quasi-judicial in nature39 in
which the arbitrator is disinterested in the outcome and the parties before
her.40 It is this quasi-judicial role, which has been held to be "functionally
comparable" to a judge, that bestows immunity comparable to judicial
immunity on an arbitrator. 41
The "functional comparability" standard was first set forth by the
Supreme Court in Butz v. Econonou.42 In Butz, the Court extended
immunity to executive branch officials sued for alleged violations of
citizens' constitutional rights. 43 The Court explained that immunity is not
32 See id. at 237.
33 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880).
3 4 See id. at 141.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 143.
37 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 237.
38 This belief, embraced in New York in Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151
N.Y.S.2d. 221, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), aFd, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957),
and later in the Third Circuit in Cain v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113,
114-115 (3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam), has been adopted throughout federal and state courts.
39 In Burchell v. Marsh, the Supreme Court stated: "Arbitrators are judges chosen by
the parties to decide the matters submitted to them .... " Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344,
349 (1855). See also Cahn, 311 F.2d at 114-115.
40 1. & F. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos
Workers Local 8, 493 F. Supp. 147, 149 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
41 See, e.g., Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209-1211 (6th Cir.
1982).
42 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
43 See id. at 480. Quasi-judicial immunity was granted to administrative law judges,
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based on the identity of the actor but rather on the quasi-judicial nature of
the responsibilities and actions performed. 44 In other words, immunity
depends on the "functional comparability" of an individual's acts and
judgments to those of judges. 45 Courts seized upon an arbitrator's
adjudicatory role as analogous to a judge's when applying the "functional
comparability" standard.
46
The Supreme Court cited other policy reasons justifying absolute
immunity to those performing quasi-judicial functions. The Court reasoned
absolute immunity is important to preserve the independence necessary for
decisionmakers to perform "without harassment or intimidation. "17 Second,
quasi-judicial proceedings share many of the same characteristics as judicial
ones and as a result should be afforded the same safeguards to secure
impartiality. 48 Because both proceedings have built-in procedural safeguards
to prevent possible constitutional infringements, the extension of immunity
would not endanger the integrity of the decisionmaking process. 49 When
these safeguards are deficient, however, the Court pointed out that private
damage actions may be needed in order to deter misconduct. 50
The debate between absolute and qualified immunity centers around
whether the arbitration process contains the same procedural safeguards as
the judicial process to warrant absolute immunity. Professor Nolan, an
advocate of absolute immunity, concedes that the analogy between the
judicial process and the arbitration process is not perfect. 5 1 Primarily,
arbitrators do not have to follow precedent. Second, arbitration awards are
not easily appealable. 52 Mark A. Sponseller, an advocate for qualified
immunity for arbitrators, adds that arbitrators are not bound by the rules of
federal agency examiners and various agency officials performing either quasi-judicial or
prosecutorial functions.
44See id. at 511-512.
45 See id.
46 See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The
functional comparability of the arbitrators' decisionmaking process and judgments to those of
judges and agency hearing examiners generates the same need for independent judgment, free
from the threat of lawsuits. Immunity furthers this need.").
47 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978); accord Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211;
Feichtinger v. Conant, 873 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1995).
48 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
49 See id. Both quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings are adversarial in nature,
conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence and have the right of judicial
review. See id.
50 See id.
51 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 234.
5 2 See id.
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evidence and rules of legal procedures. 53 Additionally, Sponseller argues
that arbitrators are not politically insular because they are often participants
in the same industry in which they arbitrate disputes. 54 The absence of a
transcript of the proceedings and the lack of declared findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the arbitration process, according to Sponseller, also
nullifies any parallelism between the judicial and the arbitration process. 55
Professor Nolan maintains that notwithstanding the differences between
the judicial and arbitration processes ample safeguards exist to justify
absolute immunity. 56 Nolan points out that arbitration is voluntary and thus
both parties are aware of the risks. 57 Self-preservation will also serve to
negate "political pressures" on arbitrators: "political" decisions would be
professional suicide as disputants would have no confidence in an
arbitrator's neutrality. 58 Arbitrators, being members of the industry they
arbitrate in, generally follow the accepted practices and ethical codes similar
to precedent. 59 Finally, Nolan asserts arbitration is an adversarial process
and arbitration awards are subject to judicial review through vacatur.60
53 See Sponseller, supra note 7. at 436.
54 See id. at 436-437.
55 See id. at 436.
56 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 234; see also Lois J. Cole & John B. Lewis,
Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Arbitration Related Resolution Procedures-
Preemption, Collateral Estoppel, and Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege Should Be
Expanded, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 677 (1996). Cole and Lewis maintain that absolute immunity
must be extended to the entire arbitral process to protect libel and slander litigation arising
from the allegedly defamatory statements made during the arbitration process. See id.
57 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 234. Sponseller denounces Nolan's contention
that parties presumably know the risks that are involved in arbitration. Sponseller argues that
many parties are not aware or assume that an arbitrator will not act with malice or bias.
Sponseller, supra note 7, at 437. I would add that Professor Nolan also fails to address the
fact that arbitration clauses are frequently included in many consumer adhesion contracts.
Nolan also states: "Only those who wish to will use [arbitration]." Nolan & Abrams, supra
note 7, at 234. Again, this simplistic view does not reflect the amount of compulsory
arbitration clauses that consumers must agree to when purchasing products.
58 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 234. This assumes, however, that both sides
would become aware of an arbitrator's bias. A newcomer to the arbitration process may
presume that an arbitrator will be fair and not attempt to determine the arbitrator's reputation.
59 See id. According to Sponseller, familiarity with industry practices is not binding and
"no substitute for the rules of precedent and the threat of appellate review." Sponseller, supra
note 7, at 437.
60 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 234 n.37. Nolan does acknowledge that
parties cannot easily overturn an erroneous arbitration award. See id. The Federal Arbitration
Act also provides for the right to mandatory right of review. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
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Although the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 61 does not address the
issue of arbitral immunity, the courts have developed their own policy
justifications62 for affording absolute immunity to arbitrators. Referring to
the FAA, courts have declared that federal policy encourages arbitration and
arbitrators are indispensable actors in furtherance of that policy.
63
Arbitrators have no interest in the outcome of the dispute and should not be
forced to become parties to the dispute simply because one party is unhappy
with the arbitrator's decision. 64 Furthermore, the threat of lawsuits would
deter arbitrators from volunteering their expertise and services, in effect,
emasculating the federal policy promoting arbitration. 65 These policy
justifications are professed by the courts as the rationale behind expanding
arbitral immunity to sponsoring organizations, arbitration panels, appraisers
and others performing "arbitral" roles.
III. EXPANSION OF ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
A. Arbitration Proceedings
The doctrine of arbitral immunity has been expanded to encompass
much more than an arbitrator's decision. Just as judicial immunity was
extended to include the administrative workings of the court, arbitral
immunity has been held to include the entire arbitral process. In Corbin v.
Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., a South Carolina federal court held
that evidence presented, even libelous, was absolutely privileged. 66
(1988).
61 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
62 Most of these policy arguments are in addition to the reasons cited for extending
judicial immunity-independence of the decisionmaking process and decisional finality-into
the arbitration process.
63 See, e.g., Hill v. ARO Corp. 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967); see also I. &
F. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local 8,
493 F. Supp. 147, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
64 See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing
Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977)).
65 See id. Nolan calls this the "recruitment" policy strand. See Nolan & Abrams, supra
note 7, at 235. Sponseller contends that arbitrators today rarely serve infrequently and without
pay. Rather, arbitration is becoming a profession, and similar to professionals like doctors,
lawyers or accountants, arbitrators can obtain malpractice insurance to cover liability fQr
misconduct. Sponseller admits that qualified immunity needs to be legislated, because
qualified immunity that is too lenient would frustrate the national policy favoring arbitration.
See Sponseller, supra note 7, at 437-438.
66 278 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D.S.C.), afj'g 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).
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The court reasoned:
[If] arbitration is to be safely utilized as an effective means of
resolving controversy, the absolute immunity attaching to its
proceedings must extend beyond the arbitrators themselves; it must
extend to all 'indispensable' proceedings .... To urge that the
immunity should be limited to the arbitrators would be similar to
arguing that judicial immunity should go no farther than the judge.67
Arbitral immunity thereafter grew to envelop an arbitrator's capacity to
resolve disputes.
The Seventh Circuit extended arbitral immunity to protect arbitrators
from actions challenging their authority in Tamari v. Conrad.68 In this case,
the plaintiffs insisted that the selection and composition of the arbitration
panel did not comply with the terms of the agreement to arbitrate. 69 The
plaintiffs asserted that the suit was comparable to a mandamus action filed
against a judge and asked the court to declare the arbitration panel illegal
and void its award. 70 The court disagreed and found the action analogous to
dissatisfied litigants trying to void a jury verdict by suing members of the
jury claiming the jury selection was improper. 7 1 Instead of a direct suit
against the arbitrators, the court stated the plaintiffs could seek to vacate the
award or assert their claim as a defense in an action brought to enforce the
award. 72
B. Labor Relations
Federal courts have determined all arbitration agreements involving
commercial disputes are enforceable through the FAA. 73 So long as
arbitration clauses are contained in contracts that implicate interstate
commerce, the FAA will preempt state arbitration law. 74 Outside the
commercial context, arbitration is most widely used in settling labor
disputes. The FAA, however, excludes "contracts of employment of
67 Id. at 398.
68 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
69 See id. at 780.
70 See id. at 780-781.
71 See id. at 781.
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1973).
74 See id.; Howard Fields & Assocs. v. Grand Wailea Co., 848 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Hawaii 1993).
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seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. " 75 Nevertheless, Congress and the Supreme
Court have recognized the consequences of not resolving labor disputes-
quickly and have embraced labor arbitration.
76
Although some collective bargaining agreements make the labor
arbitration process unique from other industries engaged in arbitration, the
courts have clothed labor arbitration in arbitral immunity. Collective
bargaining agreements often mandate that labor disputes be "adjudicated"
by either statutorily created boards of adjustments, joint trade boards or
special joint committees of labor and management. The courts have relied
on the quasi-judicial role that these boards and committees perform77 and
the national policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes in extending
immunity. 7 8
Labor arbitration also raises the question whether absolute immunity is
appropriate.7 9 Bipartite and tripartite arbitration boards containing party-
appointed arbitrators, representing either labor or management, are common
in labor arbitration. Additionally, these party-appointed arbitrators are
expected to act in a partisan manner, as agents of their respective
affiliations. 80 Arbitral immunity rests on the premise that the arbitrators'
role is "functionally comparable" with that of a judge. 8 1 Although labor
75 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
76 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 236 nn.44-47.
77E.g., Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 567 F. Supp 1410, 1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(special joint committee of labor and management); 1. & F. Corp. v. International Ass'n of
Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local 8, 493 F. Supp. 147, 150 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (joint trade board); Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1340, 1343-1344
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (statutory airline board of adjustment); Merchant Despatch Transportation
Corp. v. Systems Fed'n Number One Ry. Employees' Dept. AFL-CIO Carmen, 444 F. Supp.
75, 77 (N.D. III. 1977) (special Board of Adjustment established under National Railway
Labor Act).
78 See L &F. Corp., 493 F. Supp. at 150.
79 Professor Nolan asserts that the lack of neutrality inherent when arbitrators are
interested in the outcome vitiates absolute immunity. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at
238-239.
80 See id. at 239. In City of Hayward, the court found the city-appointed arbitrator was
an agent and refused to extend arbitral immunity to the agent and the city as a sponsoring
organization. See infra Part V. For an excellent discussion on the ethical and neutrality
difficulties in tripartite arbitrations, see Desiree A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The
Elusive Quest for Justice in Tipartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LE AL ETHICs 749 (1995).
Kennedy argues that partisan arbitration panels' lack of impartiality and neutrality greatly
stretches the integrity of the entire arbitration process. See id. at 781-787.
81 See supra Part lU.B.
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arbitrators adjudicate disputes like judges, they cannot be considered as
indisputably neutral as judges. Arbitrators have been given immunity to
preserve independence, encourage recruitment and secure finality in
decisions.8 2 In the labor arbitration context, however, independence and
recruitment are not desirable objectives; therefore, only decisional finality
serves to justify an absolute immunity standard.8 3 Courts have, nonetheless,
widely granted absolute immunity to "partisan" labor arbitrators.84
C. Arbitral Institutions
Arbitration associations acquire their immunity from the arbitrator.85 In
other words, an arbitration association can only be held vicariously liable
for those acts which an arbitrator is deemed personally liable. In 1982, the
Sixth Circuit broadened the net of immunity to include organizations that
sponsor arbitration proceedings. 8 6 The plaintiff, Corey, was denied damages
by a New York Stock Exchange arbitration panel after a brokerage firm
allegedly allowed an incapacitated broker to advise Corey and other
clients.8 7 Corey sued the brokerage firm and the stock exchange separately
for conspiracy to deprive him of a fair hearing.8 8 After laying the
foundation of arbitral immunity, the court stated:
82 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 239.
83 See id.
84 See supra note 77. Courts have interpreted the term arbitration broadly to include
joint trade boards and special grievance committees as dispute resolution mechanisms. The
Southern District of Ohio stated:
[It] is not arbitration per se that federal policy favors, but rather final adjustment of
differences by a means selected by the parties. If the parties agree that a procedure other
than arbitration shall provide a conclusive resolution of their differences, federal labor
policy encourages that procedure no less than arbitration.
I. & F. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers,
Local 8, 493 F. Supp. 147, 149 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
85 See Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Cal. App. 3d 1983).
86 See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982).
87 See id. at 1208.
88 See id.
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Extension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards which sponsor
arbitration is a natural and necessary product of the policies
underlying arbitral immunity; otherwise the immunity extended to
arbitrators is illusionary. It would be of little value to the whole
arbitral procedure to merely shift the liability to the sponsoring
association.
8 9
This policy of protecting sponsoring organizations was further advanced as
the rationale for ruling that organizations are immune in their administration
of the arbitral process.
In Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE), the
plaintiffs sought relief for the mental anguish and damages caused by the
CBOE's negligent administration of an arbitration hearing. 90 At issue was
whether the CBOE could be liable for its failure to give the plaintiffs proper
notice of the arbitration proceedings. 91 The plaintiffs asserted that the acts
"being of an administrative or ministerial nature, d[id] not merit [arbitral]
immunity." 92 Judge Meskill, writing for the court, disagreed and found that
all functions integrally related to the arbitral process should be entitled to
immunity. 93 Arbitral immunity is "defined by the functions it protects and
serves," not by the characterization of acts as ministerial or
administrative. 94 Additionally, the court explained that organizations found
liable would be discouraged to sponsor future arbitrations, undermining the
federal policy favoring arbitration. 95
89 Id. at 1211.
90 898 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1990).
91 See id. at 882.
92 Id. at 885. See also supra notes 8-10, 25 and accompanying text. Sponseller argues
that the "judicial acts" limitation to immunity should dictate that arbitration associations be
liable for the damages caused by improper administrative acts. Additionally, Sponseller
contends that innocent parties should not bear the cost of the sponsoring organizations'
negligence. Arbitration associations, not unlike companies strictly liable for their products,
should bear the burden of their defective products. "[Airbitration associations can insure
against th[e] risk of damages and distribute the cost among its clientele." Sponseller, supra
note 7, at 439.
93 See Austem, 898 F.2d at 886.
94 Id. (quoting Forrester v. Allen, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)). The court, in delivering
its opinion, explored the policies underlying the extension of judicial immunity to the
arbitration process in great length. Absent was any discussion on the common law limitations
to judicial immunity. Surprisingly, the court quotes Forrester, a case denying absolute
immunity to a judge for performing nonjudicial, administrative acts. See supra note 25.
95 See Austern, 898 F.2d at 886. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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The Austern court's refusal to allow alleged "non-judicial" acts to
vitiate arbitral immunity for sponsoring organizations was reaffirmed by a
California federal district court. 96 In Cort v. American Arbitration
Association, the plaintiff argued that the American Arbitration Association's
(AAA) spoliation of evidence and breach of contract fell outside the scope
of arbitral immunity. 97 The district court held that AAA's actions were
performed "during the course of resolving a dispute between the parties"
and, thus, fell into the category of acts traditionally afforded absolute
immunity. 98
D. Quasi-arbitrators
Private individuals are often selected to resolve disputes in a quasi-
judicial role.99 The amount of immunity that these independent actors
enjoy, like arbitrators, depends on the "functional comparability" between
the decisionmaker and a judge.100 Contrary to the immunity extended to
arbitrators, a large variation among jurisdictions exists as to the extent
quasi-judicial immunity should be applied.101 The genesis of this
discrepancy lies in whether the parties intended to arbitrate, and the
responsibilities and functions the neutral third-party performs in the
arbitration process.
Engineers and architects, for instance, often serve as quasi-arbitrators
to resolve construction disputes between owners and contractors and usually
enjoy immunity.1° 2 Appraisers, either court-appointed or contract-required,
asked to value property for commercial purchases or divorce settlements,
however, are not usually afforded immunity. 103 Courts, questioning whether
96 See Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
97 See id. at 972.
98 See id. at 973; accord Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 797 F.2d
557, 564 (8th Cir. 1986) (NMB given immunity in deciding whether an issue is arbitrable);
Griffin v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 455 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. App. 1990) (arbitration
association not under continuing duty to rescreen all potential arbitrators after initial
screening); Olson v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 85 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1996) (NASD
immune from selecting a "tainted" arbitrator).
99 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 233.
100 See id.
101 See Sponseller, supra note 7, at 434-444 n. 123.
102 E.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962); Craviolini v. Scholer &
Fuller Associated Architects, 357 P.2d 611 (Ariz. 1960); Wilder v. Crook, 34 So. 2d 832
(Ala. 1948).
103 See Horsell Graphics Indus., Ltd. v, Valuation Counselors, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1117
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (appraisal firm not immune from the negligence of its appraisers in
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binding audits are an equivalent to an agreement to arbitrate, have denied
immunity to auditors. 104 Yet, a psychologist hired by parents to help in a
child custody dispute was granted immunity by a California court.10 5 The
court held quasi-judicial immunity was appropriate for:
[Nleutral third-parties for their conduct in performing dispute
resolution services which are connected to the judicial process and
involve either (1) the making of binding decisions, (2) the making of
findings or recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration,
mediation, conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of
pending disputes.10 6
Although no set rule has been declared regarding "quasi-arbitrators," the
unique facts of each case along with the exact function an independent third-
party performs in the arbitration process will dictate the scope of immunity
extended.
IV. ATTACKS ON ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
An action to vacate an arbitration award is the most accepted way to
challenge an award. 10 7 Parties subjected to arbitral misconduct have always
been able to have an arbitration award set aside through judicial review. l
establishing the value of stock plaintiff was contractually obligated to purchase); Levine v.
Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984) (accounting firm appointed by the trial court to value
a business interest to procure a divorce settlement refused immunity). But see Wasyl, Inc. v.
First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir. 1987) (appraiser granted immunity after
resolving asset valuation dispute).
104 See Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1955) (quasi-judicial
immunity not extended to auditors in a stockholders action). The Ganmmel court stated:
[J]udicial immunity was held dependent upon some contractual provision which called
for the exercise of independent judgment or discretion by a person acting as an
arbitrator .... [W]here the agreement does not call for the exercise of judicial authority,
ordinarily the person selected to perform skilled or professional services is not immune
from charges of negligence and is required to work with the same skill and care
exercised by an average person engaged in the trade or profession involved.
Id. at 368; see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. App. 3d
1989) (auditors denied immunity from binding audit).
105 See Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. App. 3d 1990).
10 6 Id. at 903.
107 See Sponseller, supra note 7, at 422.
108 See id.
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Arbitration awards are not self-executing; thus, compliance can be enforced
only through judicial order. 109 The FAA, which controls commercial
arbitration, has adopted the common law grounds for vacating an arbitration
award: (1) when the award was "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;" (2) when an arbitrator exhibits "evident partiality;" (3) when
misconduct by an arbitrator prejudices the right of a party; or (4) when an
arbitrator exceeds his or her power. 110 Most states follow these same
grounds through the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act. 111
These limited grounds for review have led some disappointed parties to
attempt civil suits against arbitrators or organizations in charge of the
administration of the arbitration process. 112 Akin to judicial immunity, the
scope of arbitral immunity is limited to "arbitral acts" and acts within the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. 113 Most attacks on the scope of arbitral immunity
are rooted in claims of improper conduct that violate one of these
restrictions on immunity.114
A number of theories have nevertheless been advanced without success
in attempts to defeat arbitral immunity.115 Plaintiffs' attempts to challenge
the arbitrator's jurisdiction have been dismissed, 116 as well as collateral
attacks on an arbitrator's award."17 Tort actions alleging negligence, mental
anguish, conspiracy to defraud and various other torts have also been
dismissed on the grounds of arbitral immunity." 8  Courts have
109 See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977).
110 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
111 See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1985).
112 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 239-240. See also supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text.
113 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 239-240.
114 See id. at 240.
115 See generally Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 240-250. For purposes of this
Note, only an overview of the scope and limits of arbitral immunity is presented. Nolan and
Abrams cover the attacks on arbitral immunity in great detail.
116 See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 778 (7th Cir. 1977). Although the
jurisdictional challenge was correctly brought prior to the arbitration hearing, the court held
that the arbitrator is not a proper party to the suit. See id. at 780. The party questioning the
arbitrator's jurisdiction can bring pre-hearing declaratory action against the opposing party.
See id. at 781.
117 Courts universally dismiss arbitrators or sponsoring organizations when included in
suits brought to vacate an arbitration award. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 242-243.
118 E.g., Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(negligence and spoliation of evidence); Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898
F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990) (mental anguish); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 567 F. Supp.
1410 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (tortious interference with contractual rights), Cahn v. International
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systematically dismissed claims for constitutional and statutory
violations, 119 as well as claims for breach of contract. 120 Lastly, although
still untested in the courts, arbitrators may face potential liability if deemed
to be "fiduciaries" under federal pension laws. 121
As a general rule, arbitrators also possess a "testimonial privilege"
when subpoenaed or deposed in order to clarify or impeach an award. 122
The exception to the rule occurs when a reasonable basis of arbitral
misconduct exists. 123 Courts have also allowed two other exceptions to
absolute arbitral immunity. As a matter of law, arbitral immunity does not
act to bar claims for equitable relief. 124
Arbitral immunity has similarly been held not to extend to the
nonperforming arbitrator, "one guilty of nonfeasance rather than
Ladies' Garment Union, 203 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa.), affid, 311 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1962)
(per curiam) (conspiracy to defraud); Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 85 F.3d
381 (8th Cir. 1996) (negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation).
119 E.g., Shrader v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 122, 124
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (NASD is not a state actor for purposes of violations of the Civil Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1983)); UAW Local 656 & 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1187
(6th Cir. 1983) (court held Congress did not intend to abrogate arbitral immunity when
passing ERISA statute); Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Eighth
Amendment only applies to criminal punishment, not to an arbitration decision); Raitport v.
Provident Nat'l Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (action for civil rights violations
dismissed); Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1995) (arbitrator held immune
from claims alleging that the arbitrator deprived a party of its due process rights).
120 See Hill v. ARO Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967). The plaintiff
creatively claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of the arbitrator's implied agreement with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to comply with its regulations. The court
dismissed the suit citing arbitral immunity. See id. at 326. Courts have held that arbitrators
have breached their employment contract with parties, but only for complete nonperformance.
See infra notes 125-136 and accompanying text.
121 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 249-250. Greyhound Lines held that ERISA
did not abrogate arbitral immunity. The court, though, failed to make any determinations on
whether arbitrators were "fiduciaries" under ERISA. See Greyhound Lines, 701 F.2d at 1181.
Nolan and Abrams argue: "The policy bases of the arbitral immunity doctrine-finality,
independence, and recruitment--weigh as powerfuilly against liability in pension cases as in
others." Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 251.
122 See Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich, 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978);
Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
123 See Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 230 S.E.2d 380 (N.C.
1976).
124 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Sinicropi, No. 93 CIV. 3094 (CSH), 1994 WL
132233 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1994).
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misfeasance." ' 12 5 In all three cases on point, the arbitrator failed to render an
award within a reasonable amount of time. 126 In E. C. Ernst, Inc. v.
Manhattan Construction Co., the architect acting as a "quasi-arbitrator"
failed to evaluate and submit plans and specifications.1 27 The court held that
the architect's inaction was not "functionally judge-like" to warrant
immunity. 128
Graphic Arts International Union Local 508 v. Standard Register Co.
is another leading case holding an arbitrator liable for nonperformance. 12 9
The union filed suit against Standard Register and the arbitrator after the
company refused to allow the arbitrator to be replaced. 130 The district court
found the arbitrator liable for failing to render a decision. 131
The final example of the "nonperformance exception" to arbitral
immunity is unique in that the court's ruling was overruled by legislation
instead of an appeals court. 132 In Baar v. Tigerman, the arbitrator was sued
after failing to furnish an award within seven months after the hearing. 133
The appellate court held that an arbitrator who does not render a timely
decision is not entitled to immunity. 134 Additionally, the court found that an
arbitration association derives its immunity from the arbitrator. 135 Thus, the
plaintiffs cause of action against the AAA for negligently selecting an
arbitrator was valid. 136 The California legislature responded to the Baar
ruling by passing a statute reaffirming absolute arbitral immunity as a
matter of state law.137
The limits to arbitral immunity are, in brief, the following:
1. Arbitrators, like all other citizens, are liable for any crimes they
commit;
2. Arbitrators are liable for negligence or breach of contract if they
totally fail to perform their obligations;
125 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 251.
126 See id.
127 551 F.2d 1026, 1034, reh'g granted in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
128 See id. at 1033.
129 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2212 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Cal. App. 3d 1983).
133 See id. at 836.
134 See id. at 835.
135 See id. at 839.
136 See id. at 839-840.
137 See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (West Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 12:3 1997]
ARBITRAL IMMUNITY AFTER UNITED STATES v. CITY OF HAYWARD
3. Arbitrators who violate a person's constitutional or civil rights,
an unlikely event, might be subject to injunctive or declaratory
relief; and
4. Arbitrators might be compelled to testify or produce documents
(a) when they fail to make a timely assertion of their testimonial
privilege; (b) when the request does not pertain to the arbitrator's
decisional process ... ; or (c) when the request involves the
arbitrator's own misconduct and the moving party has previously
demonstrated an "objective basis" for a "reasonable belief" that
the asserted misconduct actually occurred. 138
V. UVNTED STATES V. CrIy OF HA YWARD
Arbitral immunity does not extend to a city that requires its citizens to
submit to the decision of a city-appointed arbitrator. 139 The court's holding
in City of Hayward seems to establish an outer boundary to absolute
immunity. At issue was whether the City of Hayward could be held liable
for an arbitrator's decision violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA).140 S.G.
Borello & Sons, Inc. (Borello) owned and operated a mobile home park in
Hayward, California. 141 In response to a 1988 amendment of the FHA,
Borello terminated the park's adults-only policy and permitted families to
live in the park. 142
Tenants of the park responded by filing a petition with the City of
Hayward's Rent Review Office seeking rent reduction due to a decrease in
housing services. 143 The City's rent control ordinance mandated that an
arbitrator be appointed to determine whether Borello's action in fact reduced
services. 144 The city-appointed arbitrator agreed with the tenants that
permitting children in the park was a reduction in services that effectively
resulted in an increase of rent. 145 The arbitrator awarded a rent reduction,
and Borello filed an administrative complaint with the federal government
alleging the arbitrator's awarded rent reduction interfered with Borello's
compliance with the FHA.146
138 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 260-261.
139 See United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 65 (1995).
140 See id.
141 See Id. at 834.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 835.
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The United States brought suit against the City for violation of § 3617
of the FHA.147 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
United States and permanently enjoined the City from interpreting its
ordinance in a manner that penalized Borello's compliance with the FHA.148
The court, however, denied the United States' claim for compensatory and
punitive damages and both parties appealed. 149
On appeal, the City claimed arbitral immunity applies because the
arbitrator was an independent adjudicatory officer, rather than a city
employee, and the City was merely a sponsoring organization. 150 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed and found the arbitrator was in reality an agent of the City
with delegated powers to interpret and enforce the City's rent control
ordinance. 151 Further, the court concluded that sponsoring organizations
administer voluntarily submitted disputes, which was not the case at bar. 1
52
Because Borello was compelled to submit to arbitration mandated by a city
ordinance before a city-appointed arbitrator, the court held the City liable
for any compensatory damages resulting from the arbitrator's interpretation
and enforcement of the rent control ordinance.15 3
The Ninth Circuit's ruling, clearly the right decision, may be the end to
the expansion of arbitral immunity. Arbitral acts have been deemed to be as
broad as judicial acts. 154 Despite the common law "administrative acts"
exception to judicial immunity, sponsoring organizations have been given
absolute immunity in administering the arbitration process. Yet, the court's
categorization of the city-required arbitration as an administrative
proceeding was consistent with the "administrative acts" exception. An
alternative interpretation for the court's decision may be that the court did
not limit arbitral immunity in any real way; rather, the court clarified what
constitutes arbitration. It is unclear whether other courts will extend arbitral
immunity to non-voluntary legislatively mandated arbitration proceedings
even if arbitrators are appointed by a truly neutral sponsoring organization.
Regardless, the ruling should put other cities, states and municipalities on
notice that the shield of arbitral immunity may not protect them in
legislatively mandated arbitration.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 838.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 840.
154 See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 7, at 237.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The arbitration process and its participants enjoy immunity from
liability second only to the judicial process. The strong national policy in
favor of arbitration has been the impetus behind the expansion of arbitral
immunity. Sponsoring organizations and others performing quasi-judicial
functions within private dispute mechanisms now enjoy almost absolute
immunity. This Note has examined the evolution of the doctrine of arbitral
immunity to illustrate its universal acceptance in Congress and the courts.
City of Hayward presents the possible end to the continuing extension of
arbitral immunity. Its full impact, however, remains to be seen.

